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BIOPOLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES: BETWEEN 
DATAFICATION AND GOVERNANCE 
Orly Lobel* 
 
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means 




Julie Cohen’s dazzling tour de force Between Truth and Power asks us to 
consider the new ways powerful actors extract valuable resources for gain and 
dominance.2  Cohen in particular warns that “the universe of personal data as 
a commons [is] ripe for exploitation.”3  Cohen writes that “if protections 
against discrimination, fraud, manipulation, and election interference are to 
be preserved in the era of infoglut, regulators will need to engage more 
directly with practices of data-driven, algorithmic intermediation and their 
uses and abuses.”4  I read Between Truth and Power as not only a compelling 
account of the contemporary transformations of law and technology but also 
a call to action.  This Essay takes up Cohen’s challenge by considering ways in 
which governments can engage in new forms of governance to leverage the 
very same biopolitical data extracted by private actors for profit purposes in 
service of public goals of fairness, equality, and distributive justice.  In 
particular, the Essay describes several current contexts that demonstrate how 
datafication can, and indeed should, be employed to aid regulatory research, 
enforcement, and accountability.  The three examples I focus on are: first, 
current developments in labor market information flows that are attempting 
to address salary inequities, labor market concentration, and bias; second, the 
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  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
 1 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 2 See generally JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019). 
 3 Id. at 51. 
 4 Id. at 200. 
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technique of scraping data off platforms in service of regulatory compliance; 
third, the issue of monitoring and tracking viral spread during a global 
pandemic.  I argue that if we are to take Cohen’s framework seriously, then 
policymakers have no choice but to identify opportunities within disruptive 
technological changes and to mirror, rather than attempt to block, these 
innovations. 
In their book She Said, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalists Jodi Kantor and 
Megan Twohey describe a meeting they had with Chai Feldblum, then Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Commissioner.5  Feldblum 
told the reporters “‘[w]e know internally who the companies are that have the 
most charges’ . . . .  [b]ut the agency was prohibited from making that 
information public.  Before taking a job, a woman could not check with the 
EEOC to see what kind of record the prospective employer had on 
harassment.”6  The journalists concluded that the United States had a “system 
for muting sexual harassment claims, which often enabled the harassers 
instead of stopping them.”7  But could we leverage today’s technologies, 
online connectivity, and data against such systems of silence?  Could we 
imagine the endless opportunities, beyond the imminent risks, that 
datafication offers to longstanding democratic goals and challenges? 
Between Truth and Power rejects the conventional story that law lags 
behind markets, always struggling to keep up in the face of disruption and 
innovation.  Rather, Cohen shows us that law is already being mobilized, 
helping powerful actors engender the changes we see now.8  This time 
around, law is being reconfigured, substantively and performatively, de facto 
and de jure, to help reshape, and profit from, what Cohen calls the 
biopolitical public domain.9  I agree with this description.  Precisely for the 
reason that law is in the mix at the very beginning of any paradigmatic shift, 
lawmakers and scholars must be creative and forward thinking in finding 
windows and shaping the law in ways that promote public ends. 
 
I.  WAGE DISCRIMINATION AND INFORMATION FLOW REFORMS 
 
In a new article, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows and the Future 
of Pay Equity, I argued that recent law reforms in the field of wage 
discrimination are focused on correcting a longstanding information 
imbalance in the labor market: employers demand secrecy from their 
employees about compensation and rarely reveal the pay scale of the company 
to prospective and current employees; at the same time, however, employers 
extract information from employees about their salary histories as well as 
 
 5 JODI KANTOR & MEGAN TWOHEY, SHE SAID: BREAKING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
STORY THAT HELPED IGNITE A MOVEMENT 80 (2019). 
 6 Id. at 80–81. 
 7 Id. at 81. 
 8 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 8, 139–40. 
 9 See id. at 48–49. 
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share wage information with other businesses.10  This information imbalance 
has long prevented employees from detecting pay discrimination and 
knowing whether their talents are adequately valued.11 
New reforms in state law and federal caselaw are targeting these 
information asymmetries by banning employers from asking job candidates 
about their salary histories, relying on salary histories, or prohibiting 
employees from discussing their salaries with other workers or third parties.12  
Some law reforms go a step further by requiring employers to provide a pay 
scale for a position13 and, even more impactfully, requiring employers to 
annually report data about employee race, gender, and ethnicity to the 
EEOC.14  Self-reported numbers are easily manipulated, and therefore we 
might imagine a role for digital platforms in creating more systematic 
transparency, which in turn can mobilize workers and aid regulators with 
enforcement.  Platforms such as LinkedIn, Glassdoor, Salary.com, and 
SalaryExpert crowdsource salary information, helping employees in their job 
searches and negotiations.15  Glassdoor, for example, has a pay data tool called 
Know Your Worth that dynamically analyzes trends to provide an increasingly 
accurate estimate of a position and an employee’s market value.16 
 
 10 See 120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 549, 589–90 (2020). 
 11 See id. at 549, 558. 
 12 See id. at 550, 567–87. 
 13 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(c). 
 14 See Amy Conway, Stephanie Scheck & Carroll Wright, End to EEO-1 Component 2 Pay 
Data Reporting for Now . . ., JD SUPRA (March 2, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/end-to-eeo-1-component-2-pay-data-20353/; Notice of 
Proposed Changes to the EEO-1 Report to Collect Pay Data from Certain Employers, U.S. EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/notice-proposed-changes-eeo-1-report-collect-pay-data-
certain-employers (last visited Apr. 17, 2021).  A “new California law somewhat addresses 
pay transparency by extending—from two years to three—an employer’s obligation to 
maintain records of wages and pay rates, job classifications, and other terms of employment, 
though the records are kept confidential unless they are ordered in discovery.”  Lobel, supra 
note 10, at 591 n.287; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197(e). 
 15 Benjamin Arendt, Glassdoor?  Google?  LinkedIn?  Any Which Way, the Future of 
Recruiting Is Transparency, TALENT DAILY (June 6, 2018, 4:16 PM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190403021951/https://www.cebglobal.com/talentdaily/
glassdoor-google-linkedin-any-which-way-the-future-of-recruiting-is-transparency/.  
 16 Know Your Worth, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/Salaries/know-your-
worth.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2021); see Susan Adams, How Companies Are Coping with the 
Rise of Employee-Review Site Glassdoor, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2016, 3:49 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2016/02/24/how-companies-are-coping-with-
the-rise-of-employee-review-site-glassdoor/; Jillian Kramer, Are You Worth More This Year than 
You Were in 2018?, GLASSDOOR (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.glassdoor.com/blog/are-you-
worth-more-this-year; Queenie Wong, Are You Getting Paid Enough?  LinkedIn Launches Salary 
Comparison Tool, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016, 6:27 AM), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/11/02/are-you-getting-paid-enough-linkedin-
launches-salary-tool/. 
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Nobel laureate Gary Becker described in his research on labor market 
inequities the way in which secrecy was the fuel for continued inequality.17  
Secrecy prevents employees from knowing whether they earn less than their 
peers, as well as whether they are alone in wage theft due to misclassification, 
unpaid overtime, and other noncompliance.  For years, economists have 
estimated billions in lost wages due to imperfect information.18  With the use 
of crowdsourced platforms, secrecy norms are changing, and for millennials, 
“[p]ay confidentiality has been eroding for years.”19  This is in large part due 
to access to online data and social networks. 
Beyond detection of salary inequities, data mining can help uncover, and 
tame, persisting biases and narratives that contribute to inequality in the 
workplace.  An example of such efforts is a service named Textio, which mines 
through job searches and labor market advertisements and discovers how 
certain phrases used in ads of job openings, such as military analogies like 
“mission critical,” can result in fewer women applicants.20  Many employers 
want to increase the diversity of their workforce, and this kind of analysis can 
provide them with important tools.  Textio has identified more than twenty-
five thousand phrases that indicate gender bias.21  Words like “top-tier,” 
“aggressive,” “coding ninja,” “fast-paced work environment,” and sports 
terms, like the military jargon, decrease women applicants, while words like 
“partnerships” and “passion for learning” attract more women.22  This kind 
of data analytics service is an example of potentially creating more inclusive 
job listings using new technological capabilities. 
In my article The Law of the Platform, I argued that the normative 
challenges facing policy for a digital platform era are not new: 
 
 17 See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 9–18 (2d. ed. 1971); see 
also PAY SECRECY AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH. (2014), 
https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Q016.pdf (“While there may be no direct 
link between pay secrecy and pay inequality, pay secrecy appears to contribute to the gender 
gap in earnings.”). 
 18 See Richard A. Hofler & Kevin J. Murphy, Underpaid and Overworked: Measuring the 
Effect of Imperfect Information on Wages, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 511, 512, 525 (1992); Yannis M. 
Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and 
Inequality, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1056, 1056 (2004); Alexandre Mas, Does Transparency 
Lead to Pay Compression? 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20558, 2014), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20558. 
 19 Howard Risher, Pay Transparency is Coming, 46 COMP. & BENEFITS REV. 3, 3 (2014). 
 20 See Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?, N.Y. TIMES (June 
25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-hire-better-
than-a-human.html. 
 21 See Emily Peck, Here Are the Words that May Keep Women from Applying for Jobs, 
HUFFPOST (June 2, 2015, 2:24 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/textio-unitive-bias-
software_n_7493624. 
 22 See T.L. Andrews, Just a Few Words Can Increase Female and Minority Job Applicants by 
More than 20%, QUARTZ (July 11, 2017), https://qz.com/1023518/just-a-few-words-can-
increase-female-and-minority-job-applicants-by-over-20/; Miller, supra note 20. 
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These emerging challenges of equity and identity on the platform 
reveal the inevitable points of tension that policymakers have always 
faced.  Balancing equality and anonymity, inclusion and credibility, 
and safety and privacy is not a new legal challenge.  At the same time, 
the platform presents new opportunities for monitoring and 
compliance in order to reach a desirable delicate balance.  
Technology-based monitoring can detect misbehavior in more 
accurate and fine-tuned ways than broad-brush rules that risk stifling 
experimentation and growth.23 
Technology has the advantage of reducing the viability of claims that such 
tradeoffs between our normative commitments to efficiency and equality, 
privacy and accountability, and so forth are too insurmountable, 
incommensurable, unknowable, or too costly to achieve.  It helps uncover 
which companies have traditionally hidden behind formal job descriptions 
and divisions between positions.  Software devoted to data analytics for 
inclusion and core values is a frontier that scholars should celebrate and study. 
 
II.  SCRAPING FOR THE COMMON GOOD 
 
In Between Truth and Power, Cohen explains how the law enables both 
data harvesting and data enclosure—a performative process—via platforms 
extracting massive amounts of information from users, turning the data into 
profitable resources, and, in turn, claiming ownership over this extracted 
information.24  But what if governments, or private actors in service of public 
ends, could similarly collect and make use of data?  Legal entrepreneurship, 
as Cohen refers to it,25 is not an exclusive activity of the for-profit sector, and 
even within the for-profit sector, startups can profit from targeting the 
regulatory arbitrage that other startups have been profiting from, in aid of 
regulatory compliance. 
Examples of such entrepreneurial spirit are new data companies that 
offer their services to cities to monitor short term rentals.26  These companies 
have been scraping listings off platforms like Airbnb and VRBO and 
comparing these listings with formally licensed short-term rentals, in 
compliance with local laws.27  They are finding massive amounts of 
noncompliance.28  These startups, for example Host Compliance and STR 
Helper, offer cities a way to recover unpaid taxes by using similar data analytics 
that other companies use to serve other ends.29  According to the CEO of 
 
 23 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 165 (2016). 
 24 COHEN, supra note 2, at 44–45. 
 25 Id. at 9, 25. 
 26 Tom Banse, Pacific Northwest Cities Hire Outside Vendors to Police Airbnb-Type Rentals, 
NW NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nwnewsnetwork.org/post/pacific-
northwest-cities-hire-outside-vendors-police-airbnb-type-rentals. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. 
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Host Compliance, Airbnb is engaged in “‘a city -by-city, block-by-block 
guerrilla war’ against local governments.”30  Using startups that focus their 
energies on data analytics in service of the law is one way to offset the power 
of such guerrilla tech wars. 
These sorts of initiatives by competing market actors collect data by 
“scraping”—gathering data from other platforms through automation.  
Scraping is a technique increasingly used not only for profit but for public 
ends, including accountability and compliance.31  Journalists are increasingly 
scraping data for investigative exposés.32  In 2016, ProPublica published a 
story about Amazon’s pricing algorithm that used simulations of purchases 
after scraping Amazon product listings.33  The Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
developed scrapers for a 2017 Pulitzer Prize-nominated national investigation 
called “Doctors & Sex Abuse.”34  Scraping was essential for the investigation 
since the reporters’ requests for public records to medical boards and 
regulatory agencies were mostly not fulfilled.35  Instead, the reporters scraped 
board orders from public websites finding more than one hundred thousand 
disciplinary documents.36 
Researchers are also increasingly turning to scraping to conduct studies 
in many different contexts.  One prominent study that used scraping was 
conducted by the Harvard Business School on racial discrimination on 
Airbnb.37  The researcher found that Airbnb hosts were sixteen percent less 
 
 30 Paris Martineau, Inside Airbnb’s ‘Guerrilla War’ Against Local Governments, WIRED 
(Mar. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-airbnbs-guerrilla-war-
against-local-governments/. 
 31 See D. Victoria Baranetsky, Data Journalism and the Law, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/data-journalism-and-the-
law.php. 
 32 See Julia Angwin & Surya Mattu, Amazon Says It Puts Customers First.  But Its Pricing 
Algorithm Doesn’t, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 20, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/amazon-says-it-puts-customers-first-but-its-pricing-
algorithm-doesnt; see also Sophie Chou, To Scrape or Not to Scrape: Technical and Ethical 
Challenges of Collecting Data Off the Web, STORYBENCH (Apr. 4, 2016), 
http://www.storybench.org/to-scrape-or-not-to-scrape-the-technical-and-ethical-
challenges-of-collecting-data-off-the-web/; Shelly Tan, Five Data Scraping Tools for Would-Be 
Data Journalists, KNIGHT LAB (Mar. 20, 2014), 
https://knightlab.northwestern.edu/2014/03/20/five-data-scraping-tools-for-would-be-
data-journalists/. 
 33 See Angwin & Mattu, supra note 32. 
 34 See How the Doctors & Sex Abuse Project Came About, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
http://doctors.ajc.com/about_this_investigation/?ecmp=doctorssexabuse_microsite_stori
es (last visited Apr. 17, 2021); Finalist: The Atlanta Journal-Constitution Staff, PULITZER PRIZES, 
https://www.pulitzer.org/finalists/staff-187 (last visited Apr. 17, 2021). 
 35 See How the Doctors & Sex Abuse Project Came About, supra note 34. 
 36 See id.; see also Carrie Teegardin & Danny Robbins, Still Forgiven, ATLANTA J.-CONST. 
(2018), http://doctors.ajc.com/still_forgiven/?ecmp=doctorssexabuse_microsite_nav. 
 37 See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the 
Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Apr. 2017, at 
1. 
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likely to accept requests from guests with African American names compared 
to identical requests from guests with distinctly white names.38 
The caselaw concerning the legality of web scraping has changed since 
the early 2000s when the first web scraping cases were litigated.39  Scraping 
poses possible liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).40  
The CFAA has a broad anti-hacking provision against whoever “intentionally 
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and 
thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer.”41  Many 
courts use the CFAA as a gauge to determine whether particular web scraping 
should be allowed.  Specifically, courts consider whether a website has granted 
actual “access,” within the Act’s meaning, and the data’s purpose.  The 
question of whether the practice is lawful is, unsurprisingly, evolving, and 
unsettled.  In Sandvig v. Sessions, the ACLU represented scholars and media 
organizations that were scraping platform information to identify algorithmic 
bias.42  The ACLU argued that criminalizing a violation of a term of service 
under 1032(a)(2)(c) of the CFAA would chill research and reporting: 
“Refraining from conducting their research, testing, or investigations 
constitutes self-censorship and a loss of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.”43  
In 2018, United States District Judge John D. Bates wrote, “scraping plausibly 
falls within the ambit of the First Amendment.”44  As the law continues to 
shape in relation to the new wave of datafication, supporting research, 
journalism, and efforts to detect and enforce policy become a top priority.  In 
an even more recent case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a 
startup, hiQ Labs, can legally scrape publicly available data from LinkedIn 
despite LinkedIn’s argument that the scraping violates user privacy.45  
LinkedIn claimed that the scraping was effectively hacking.46  HiQ Labs 
monitors workforce and labor market trends through user profile data, 
predicting, among other things, when employees are likely to leave their jobs 
 
 38 Id. at 2. 
 39 See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001); 
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Tess 
Macapinlac, The Legality of Web Scraping: A Proposal, 71 FED. COMM. L.J. 399, 402, 407–08 
(2019); Edward Roberts, Is Web Scraping Illegal?  Depends on What the Meaning of the Word Is, 
IMPERVA (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.imperva.com/blog/is-web-scraping-illegal/.  For an 
example of an international web scraping case, see generally Case C-30/14, Ryanair Ltd. v. 
PR Aviation BV, ECLI:EU:C:2015:10 (Jan. 15, 2015). 
 40 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
 41 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
 42 See 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 43 Complaint at 2, 32, Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:16-
cv-01368). 
 44 Sandvig, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 15. 
 45 HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 994, 1005 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 46 See id. at 992 (LinkedIn warned “if hiQ accessed LinkedIn’s data in the future, it 
would be violating state and federal law.”). 
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and where skills shortages are likely to occur.47  Judge Marsha Berzon rejected 
the privacy claims of LinkedIn, writing: 
[T]here is little evidence that LinkedIn users who choose to make 
their profiles public actually maintain an expectation of privacy with 
respect to the information that they post publicly, and it is doubtful 
that they do. . . .  And as to the publicly available profiles, the users 
quite evidently intend them to be accessed by others.48 
Moreover, the court held that the data was not the property of LinkedIn, but 
of the users themselves.49  It also noted that blocking hiQ would force the 
business to close.50  At the same time, the court wrote, “LinkedIn could satisfy 
its ‘free rider’ concern by eliminating the public access option, albeit at a cost 
to the preferences of many users and, possibly, to its own bottom line.”51  The 
court said that in the current design context of the platform, the data was not 
private, defining private information as “information delineated as private 
through use of a permission requirement of some sort.”52  These factors led 
the court to conclude “when a computer network generally permits public 
access to its data, a user’s accessing that publicly available data will not 
constitute access without authorization under the CFAA.”53  But when a party 
circumvents safeguards, like a username and password, to gain access to a 
computer it would likely constitute “without authorization.”54  Though a 
limited victory, there is opportunity to proactively evolve our privacy and 
computer regulations to allow access to user generated data. 
Similarly, in Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., the data Eventbrite allegedly 
took from Cvent’s website was “publicly available on the Internet, without 
requiring any login, password, or other individualized grant of access.”55  
While Cvent’s Terms of Use prohibited web scraping through denial of 
unauthorized third-party access, users were not required to manifest assent to 
the Terms of Use, for example by clicking “I agree,” before accessing the 
database, and anyone, including competitors, could access Cvent’s data.56  In 
Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc., Fidlar developed 
“software for county offices to manage public land records.”57  LPS, a real 
 
 47 See id. at 991. 
 48 Id. at 994–95. 
 49 See id. at 995. 
 50 See id. at 996–97. 
 51 Id. at 995. 
 52 Id. at 1001. 
 53 Id. at 1003. 
 54 Id.; see also DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. CV H-16-1670, 2017 WL 4837730, at *5 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 26, 2017) (Company employed anti web-scraping measures like blocking IP 
addresses and using a firewall.). 
 55 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 56 Id.; see also Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(“‘[A]ll rights’ language” in the terms of service “relates specifically to enforcement 
rights—not rights to the content of the posts.”). 
 57 Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Est. Data Sols., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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estate data analytics company, used one of Fidlar’s products to gather real 
property data and “designed a ‘web-harvester’ . . . to download county records 
en masse” from the eighty-two county databases it subscribed to (and paid 
fees to).58  LPS never had a direct contract with Fidlar.59  Characteristics of 
Fidlar’s services suggested that downloading records through another 
program, like a web-harvester, was permissible.60  Fidlar did not implement 
any encryption, and the data was accessible through other third-party 
applications.61  Thus, access through the front-end may have been limited, but 
“was completely open on the back-end.”62 
Importantly, courts may view companies who attempt to ban web 
scraping as doing so for anticompetitive goals.  LinkedIn’s interest of stopping 
hiQ’s web scraping was not enough “to outweigh hiQ’s interest in continuing 
its business, which depends on accessing, analyzing, and communicating 
information derived from public LinkedIn profiles.”63  The court in hiQ noted 
that if companies with “vast amounts of public data, are permitted selectively 
to ban only potential competitors from accessing and using that otherwise 
public data, the result . . . may well be considered unfair competition.”64  But 
some courts seem to infer wrongdoing when companies are direct 
competitors.65 
When the use of web-scraping is for academic purposes, Sandvig v. 
Sessions suggests that web scrapers can assert the First Amendment as a 
defense.66  In Sandvig, researchers were planning to use web scraping as part 
of a research paper.67  The court held “[t]he First Amendment does not give 
someone the right to breach a paywall on a news website any more than it 
gives someone the right to steal a newspaper.”68  But, “[h]ere, plaintiffs . . . 
seek only to prevent the government from prosecuting them for obtaining or 
using information that the general public can access.”69  Further, the court 
noted that if a human who creates a bot can read and interact with a website, 
then the bot should also be allowed access: 
 
 58 Id. at 1078. 
 59 See id. (“Fidlar was not a party to any of the contracts between LPS and the 
individual counties.”). 
 60 Id. at 1082. 
 61 Id. at 1082–83. 
 62 Id. at 1083. 
 63 HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 64 Id. at 998. 
 65 See, e.g., CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39, 2017 WL 83337, 
at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2017) (holding it reasonable to infer “[defendant] had constructive 
notice as to the website’s Terms and Conditions given that it is a business entity in direct 
competition with the Plaintiff”). 
 66 Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 67 See id. at 8–9. 
 68 Id. at 13. 
 69 Id. at 17. 
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The website might purport to be limiting the identities of those 
entitled to enter the site, so that humans but not robots can get in.  See 
Star Wars: Episode IV—A New Hope (Lucasfilm 1977) (“We don’t serve 
their kind here! . . .  Your droids.  They’ll have to wait outside.”).  But 
bots are simply technological tools for humans to more efficiently 
collect and process information that they could otherwise access 
manually.  Cf. Star Wars: Episode II—Attack of the Clones (Lucasfilm 
2002) (“[I]f droids could think, there’d be none of us here, would 
there?”).70 
Ultimately, in an age where data extraction is the key to tech’s future, 
web scraping law should be designed to enable more transparency, research, 
accountability, and competition. 
 
III.  DATA BETWEEN HEALTH AND PRIVACY: A GLOBAL PANDEMIC 
REQUIRES A DIFFERENT BALANCE 
 
Can governments use data reporting technology to further goals, like 
achieving public health during the COVID-19 pandemic by combatting the 
virus’s widespread transmission?  Or does monitoring and tracking citizens 
too greatly infringe on personal privacy?  These questions have become 
anything but theoretical during the current global pandemic.  And the 
variances in the response to these questions by countries around the world 
are a reminder that any such line that we strike between competing public 
goals is a normative and political decision that evolves throughout time and 
space.  Countries like Taiwan, Israel, Singapore, and South Korea did far more 
to contact trace and minimize the spread of infections than did the United 
States government, resulting in far fewer needless deaths.71 
Traditional contact tracing is done manually through in-person 
interviews at a medical facility and often involves asking patients where they 
have been, or with whom they have come in contact.  For a fast-moving virus 
such as COVID-19, this method is ineffective.  Technology has an advantage 
over manual reporting and can be used to save countless lives through an 
implementation process to help track citizens’ contact and the spread of the 
virus.  Smartphones and apps are tracking our movement and sharing the 
most personal details of who we are, who we talk to, and where we have been.  
This information can be funneled into a database and distributed to the 
public in order to inform them of potential contact with an infected 
individual.  Of course, personal privacy must be protected.  As recently stated 
by the ACLU, “[w]e need a sober consideration of the risks and tradeoffs of 
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 71 See, e.g., Justin Fendos, PART I: COVID-19 Contact Tracing: Why South Korea’s Success 
Is Hard to Replicate, GEO. J. INT’L AFFS. (Oct. 12, 2020), 
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such a system so that it protects not only the fundamental right to health, but 
also our rights of privacy and free association.”72 
There have been various response strategies around the globe as each 
country has its own battle between the health and wellness of its citizens versus 
individual privacy concerns.  In China, for example, the largest tech 
companies, Alibaba Group, Tencent Holdings, and Baidu Inc., developed 
algorithms to create ratings on their respective apps.73  These apps were 
required by the government throughout checkpoints in cities in order to 
restrict travel based on the ratings: green—unrestricted travel; yellow—seven-
day quarantine; and red—fourteen-day quarantine.74  The apps require basic 
information to sign up such as name, phone number, home address, and 
national identity card number.75  Once registered, the apps ask about health 
status, travel history, and contacts diagnosed with the virus.76 
In Israel, “the Health Ministry launched a voluntary app” in March 
“called Hamagen—The Shield in Hebrew,” which was downloaded by 1.5 
million people out of a population of nine million.77  Hamagen, a GPS 
location-based app, focused on voluntary information provided by 
coronavirus patients, but was deemed inaccurate by the ministry’s chief 
information officer.78  Meanwhile, Israel has also used Shin Bet security, 
Israel’s internal security service, to track infected citizens using mobile data, 
despite any privacy concerns.79  Israel’s Supreme Court ruled “a suitable 
alternative, compatible with the principles of privacy, must be found.”80  In 
Australia, a poll showed that over half of Australians supported the CovidSafe 
app, but only 16 percent had actually downloaded it.81  Even Australia’s top 
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coronavirus advisor with the World Health Organization said she would not 
download the app due to privacy concerns.82 
In the United States, similar contact tracing app technology has been 
created but with limited receptivity.  For example, only 1.5 percent of the total 
population of North and South Dakota had actually downloaded the apps 
released in their states.83  In Utah, less than one percent of the population 
downloaded an available tracing app.84  Google and Apple teamed up quickly 
to launch software updates to introduce an exposure notification through 
their application programming interface.85  This update would support 
COVID-19 contact tracing apps from public health authorities.86  This 
software update’s goal was to “reduce the spread of the virus, with user privacy 
and security central to the design.”87  Rather than automatically tracking 
users’ private information, users still need to download a contact tracing app 
in order for an exposure notification to come through the phone.  Similar to 





From sharing labor market information to data scraping to digital 
contact tracing, both governments and private actors can employ legal 
entrepreneurship to promote public ends, including health and safety, 
equality, and fraud detection.  As in the past, such ends must constantly be 
balanced against other public values, including privacy.  But identifying these 
biopolitical opportunities is key to expanding the capabilities of extracting 
massive amounts of information from digital life beyond the scope of private 
profit-driven sectors’ current use and toward shared public goals.  The 
tradeoffs, benefits, and costs of datafication not only evolve over time, but also 
may be strikingly different from context to context.  During a health crisis, 
technology can be used to save countless lives through an implementation 
process to help track the spread of a deadly virus.  The balance between 
preserving privacy and health, freedom of speech, equality, and many other 
democratic values will continue to be at the heart of any new technological 
capability.  Cohen’s landmark book on the policy of data warns against abuses 
of power and imbalances in our normative commitments.  But it is also a call 
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for a more positive vision, one which can only be constructed through 
engagement with new capabilities and recognition of the opportunities that 
data can offer. 
